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I. INTRODUCTION 
The minimax theorem, first discovered by von Neumann 
[15] has been generalized by Ville [141, Wald [16] and 
others. Von Neumann's original result applies to the 
case where the strategy spaces X and Y are simplices 
in and and the payoff function is bilinear. 
Wald's generalization treats X (resp y) as a space 
(resp j-j ) of probability measures § (resp ri) over a 
space A (resp B), and the payoff function as the 
expectation of a bounded kernel with respect to the 
product measure § x ri. Wald proves the minimax theorem 
under suitable conditions on A. Teh [12] further 
generalizes Wald's work. Kakutani [4] proves the minimax 
theorem, using his fixed point theorem, for X (resp Y) 
an arbitrary compact convex subset of (resp E^), 
where f is continuous, concave in x for each y, and 
convex in y for each x, Nikaido [9] extended the 
theorem to quasi-concave-convex continuous function f 
over X and Y compact convex sets in topological 
linear spaces. Fan [3] and Sion [11] treated the case 
of non-continuous f. 
In the case that two players have different payoff 
functions f(x, y) and g(x, y), with g not necessarily 
-f (the game not necessarily zero-sum), we are interested 
2 
in determining conditions for the existence of "equilibrium 
points" (x*, y*) such that 
f(x*, Y*) > f(x, y*) Vx € X 
g{x*, y*) > g(x*, y) Vy e Y 
More generally, when n players are involved, we are 
interested in determining conditions for the existence 
of equilibrium points (x^*,x^*) such that 
f i * ' ) ^i—1*' ^i' ^ i+1*' • • • J ^n*^' 
^i 
In Chapter 2, Wald's result [16] is generalized to 
the not necessarily zero-sum two-person, and Teh's 
Theorem 3-1 [1.2] is generalized to the not necessarily 
zero-sum games. 
In Chapter 5? the existence of an equilibrium point 
in the two-person, not necessarily zero-sum, case is 
demonstrated in Theorem 3.2 under a certain uniqueness 
assumption, with Y arbitrary and X homeomorphic to a 
compact subset of Banach space. Similar conditions on 
all X^ yield the existence of an equilibrium point of 
an n-person game in Theorem 3.1- This last n-person 
3 
analysis is in the spirit of Kakutani's [4] treatment of 
zero-sum games, and of Nash's [8] treatment of matrix 
games. 
In Chapter 4, certain generalizations of k-stage 
games ([2] and [10]) are discussed, and conditions given 
for the existence of equilibrium points. 
In Chapter 5? equilibrium points of n-person-matrix 
game are characterized in a manner analogous to the 
well-known characterization of saddle points of zero-sum 
two-person games. That this characterization is useful 
in the construction of equilibrium points is illustrated 
by an example. 
An attempt has been made in [13] to characterize the 
value of a two-person zero-sum game axiomatically, and 
I had hoped to persue similar ideas for the case of 
equilibrium payoffs. However, even the zero-sum approach 
in [13] seems to be defective. Hence I have limited 
myself in Chapter 6 to pursuing the axiomatic approach 
for the simplest, i.e. one-player, case [7], for which 
I have attempted to extend parts of the theorem from the 
finite to the countable case. 
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II. NON-ZERO-SUM GENERALIZATION OF THEOREMS OF WALD TYPE 
Definition 2.1. A metric space A is called conditionally 
compact if every infinite sequence from A admits a Cauchy 
subsequence. 
The above definition of conditional compactness given 
by Wald implies that, given e > 0 and a g A, there exists 
a finite number of points (a^y..., a^} with 5(a, a^) < e 
for some k. Wald calls this property "e-denSeriess". 
Definition 2.2. Let a^ € A, a^ ^ A, b^ € B, b^ € B, 
then 
^A^^l' ^2^ " suplk(a^, b) - kfa^, b)I 
bg) = sup|k(a, bj_) - k(a, bg) I 
are called intrinsic metrics with respect to A and B, 
respectively. 
Let (I , be the smallest a-algebras of subsets of 
A and B, respectively, which contain all the open subsets 
in the sense of ô and ô , respectively. Define 
C - A X B, the Cartesian product of A x B, and to be 
the smallest a-algebra of subsets of A x B which contains 
the Cartesian product of any member of A with any member 
of B. 
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Wald extends the minimax theorem of von Neumann as 
follows; 
If k(a, b) defined on A x B is bounded and 
measurable with respect to and one of A and B is 
conditionally compact, the game is strictly determined in 
the sense that 
sup inf r r k(a, b)dgdr| = inf sup P f k(a, b)dçdTi 
§ t i A B  n  §  A  B  
where d§, dri and d§dr| are probability measures over 
2, A and C (corresponding to d§, dri), respectively. 
In order to generalize Wald's minimax extension to 
the non-zero-sum case, we first define four intrinsic 
metrics 
5^ 2^(32^J ^2 ) — sup 11^2^(32^, b) — k^^ag, b) 1 
^'b,1^^1' ik2_(a, b2_) - k^(a, bg) I 
= sup I kg (a, b2_) - kg(a, bg)l 
Define (X to be the smallest a-algebra of subsets of 
6 
K, which contains all the open subsets in the sense of 
2^ and 6^ ^  and is the smallest a-algebra of 
subsets of B, which contains all the open subsets in the 
sense of 5^ ^ and 6^ g. C , d|, dr] and d§d^ are 
defined analogously to the definitions. Let 
n) = J / ki(a, b)dÇdTi 
A B 
?(§, n) = J" / kpfa, b)d§dTi 
A B 
Theorem 2.1. If k^(a, b) and b) both defined on 
A X B are both bounded and measurable with respect to , 
and A is conditionally compact with respect to both 6^ ^ 
and ^^2' there exist probability measures §* and 
rf over 0- and 8 , respectively, such that 
f(s*, rf) > sup f(§, Ti*) - e 
I 
and 
9(5*, rf) > sup g(ç*, ti) - e 
n 
where §, rt are any other probability measures over 
and S , respectively. The same result holds if B is 
conditionally compact with respect to both S _ and 
B, id 
°B,1-
Proof. Suppose that A is conditionally cpmpact with 
7 
respect i-o _ Then according to (Thsors^m 2.1) ol [IG], A, X 
B is also conditionally compact with respect to 6 . 
B, 1 
Because of the conditional compactness of the spaces 
A and B, we can subdivide them into a finite number of 
disjoint measurable subsets of diameter (with respect to 
2 and 5^ respectively) no greater than Let 
1 • 1 -iA^}, i = 1,k and {B^ ], j = 1, . . ., m be the sub­
sets of A and B specified above. Similarly we can 
p 
partition A and B into k ' subsets of [AT] and m' 
2 
subsets of [B.} with respect to ô _ and 5 . Let 
1 2 
A = Ag^ - Ag n A^j S = 1,..., k and t = 1, , k ' 
1 2 Bj = B^^ == B^ n B^, u = 1, ..., m and v = 1, ..., m' . 
Then {A/}, [Bj} are partitionings of A and B, 
respectively. Let {A^} and [By] be the non-empty 
members of these two partitions, and a^, bj be particular 
points in A^ and Bj, respectively. Let [a^j = a and 
{bj 3 = fi. With any probability measure on A, we 
associate the probability measure on a defined by 
§^(3^) = §(A^), and similarly for t] ^  on f3. Since a 
and p are finite spaces, Nash's [8] demonstration of the 
existence of equilibrium points of extensions of n-person 
matrix games applies, and there exist probability measures 
and Ti*, such that 
8 
and 
f 1 "S < 
V - / 
s p,(a,, b.) |^(a.) T,|(b.) 
E 
j 
(2) E Z kgfa., bj) ?5(a.) Ti*(bj)> 
Z kgfSi, bj) ?S(=i) 
The measures §*, rf- on A, B corresponding to the 
measure t]^ on a, p are now shown to satisfy the 
requirement of the Theorem. Since a^ is in some 
for any other x 6 A^ we have 
x) = suptk^(a^, h) - h)|. 
Hence for every 
It follows that 
Tc^(x, bj)ds ^ <k3_(a^, bj)5a 
9 
where e = I de 
(1) ; k(x, bj)ds - = 
E J (k(x, b.)dÇ ~) < Z k (a^, b )% 
i A. ] ^ i ^ ^ 
Since bj is in some B^, for any y € Bj 
kl(x, y) - 2 < b. ) 
/ kl(x, y)dT| - —^ < / kifx, bj)dTi - kj_(x, bj)ii^ 
Bj B. 3 
( 2 )  r  k i ( x ,  y ) d n  -  f  < s  k,(x, b-)Tig 
now 
f(ç, -n) - e = / f ki(x, y)dnd§ - e 
A B 
= f ( I - 2 
A B 
10 
uy r uDxni's cneorem 
by (2) 
and 
.< f Z k^fx, b. )n dS -
A j ^ ^3 
Let 
= z ( ki(x, bj)dg - a 
( 5 )  <  2 E k.(a., b. )§ n . 
J I J- 1 ] PJ 
^ ( J %i(ai, y)dTi)E 
a i 
1 "^1 
and similarly for g. Then, from (5)^ 
+ e _> f(s, n). 
For finite case, we know, there exist E* and 
'a 
11 
sucti that 
f(?;. ng) n p  
and 
9(ç;. ti*) > 9(%. Tig). 
Specifically 
f( §ct-' + G > ng). 
Hence 
sup f(§^, n*) + e > sup f(§, T|g) 
a 
' 3  g 
But 
sup f(?^, tl») = £{ÇJ, T1») 
Hence 
ng) > sup f(§, rig) - e 
1? 
or 
f(s*, n*) > sup f(§, Tf) - e. 
Using the same argument with respect to y), we 
obtain 
9(5*, n*) > sup g( S*, Ti) - e. 
Suppose that A and B both are closed intervals of 
the real axis and k(a, b) is a continuous function of 
a and b, then it is clear that A admits a Cauchy 
subsequence with respect to the intrinsic metric because 
f is uniformly continuous. Thus A is conditionally 
compact. Hence the extension of Ville's theorem for the 
zero-sum case to the non-zero-sum case is obtained as a 
special case of Theorem 1. Next, generalize Theorem 3-1 
of [12]. Let K^(x, y) be two real-valued functions on 
X X Y. For every x^ C X and a >0, define 
a) = ix = sup[K^(x, y) - K^(x^, y) ] < a]. 
Y 
Again, for every y^ € Y and b > 0, define 
VifYg, b) = [y - sup[K^(x, y) - K^(x, y^) ] < b}-
y 
15 
uerinicion 2. The space X is said to be S-conditionally 
U-compact if and only if given g > 0, there exists a 
finite subset {x^,..., x^} of X such that e) 
of the class U form a covering for X. 
Theorem 2.2. Let K^(a, b), Kg(a, b) be real-valued 
functions on A x B. Let dç be a measure on the 
o-algebra generated by U {U^}. Similarly, let 
df] be a measure on the cr-algebra generated by 
{V^} U }. Let dçdri be the product measure corre­
sponding to d§ and drj. Suppose that K^(a, b) and 
b) are measurable with respect to the product 
a-algebra x a^. Suppose also that A is S-
conditionally U^—compact and that B is S—conditionally 
-compact. Then, if 
n) = J f Kt (a, b)dÇdTi 
A B 
and 
9( 5 ,  n )  -
there exist and 
f(S*, Tf) 
I I Kgfa, 
A B 
such that, given e > 0, 
> sup f ( §, n*) - E 
§ 
14 
?(§*, n*) > sup Ti) - e . 
•n, 
Proof. Since A is S-conditionally U,-compact^ then by 
Lemma 2.2 of [12], there exists a finite subset 
{a^,..., a^] and a finite partition A^ of A 
such that a^ € A^^ for k = 1, 2, n, the A^ are 
in Qy, and 
K^(a, b) - t>) < I" Va Ç A^ and Vb € B. 
Similarly, there exists a finite subset of points 
[b^,b^} and a finite partition B^ of B 
with B^ in a^, such that 
bj € Bj for j = 1, 2,..., m 
and 
Kg (a, b) - Kg(a, b^) < ^  Vb € Bj , a € A. 
Then 
n) = J J K^(a, b)dÇdri 
B A 
15 
J' ( Z f K^fa, b)ds)dT, 
< T ( Z Kifat, b)5k)dn + 
B k ^ * * 
e 
where = J d§ 
= s (( s ; K,{a , b))dTi)ç^ 
k i Bj ^ ^ 
Let b, . be such that 
Kl(3k' \j' > Kj^(V b) - 2 
.5 ^ ^ ^kj ^ ^  ^ G 
where 
ri. = / dn. 
=i 
Now let 
3 ^ 
16 
rhen 
^ p ) — "H) G . 
similarly 
g( Tig) > 9( 5, îl) - e-
But we know there exist Ç* and rt* such that 
'a ' p 
f(ç;> ng) Tig) 
and 
9(î*. r,*) >g(ç^, ti*). 
Hence 
ng) > f(?a' >f(§' Tf ) - e 
and 
- 9(S2' ^^3) - " G. 
Thus 
17 
ng) > sup f(g. 
and 
9(§g, ng) > sup g(S* 
18 
XJ-J.. nv^jxjjj.£sjxxu>i ir'OxiNTS KUK PAYOFF FUNCTIONS 
WITH UNIQUE MAXIMA OVER NONCONVEX DOMAINS 
We begin this chapter with an immediate extension of 
the work of Kakutani [4] and Nash [8]. 
Lemma 3 ' 1 • Let f ( ^2 ' ^2 ' ' ' ' > ^ i — 1 ) 2,...J n be 
real-valued continuous functions on X^ x X^ x ••• x X^ 
where X^ are compact convex subsets of Banach space. 
Define the subset A_. .. of X 
by y e A 
• • • J ^i—1' ^ i+1' ' ' ' ' ^ 
X X X  X  ( ^ 1  ^  '  '  •  )f i—1' i+l' * ' ' •* n j-
^i+l^'  ' ' }  ^ * * * » ^i—1' ^i' ^ i+1'' ' ' '  '  
Vx^ e X^. For brevity denote the above set by A^. If all 
o 
sets A^ are convex, then there exist x^, x^,,.., 
such that 
f^(x°, x°,x°) > f^(x^, x°) 
x°) > fg(x°, X , x°) 
^n 
^n(4^ <) ^ x^ 
19 
Proor. The proof is analogous to that of Kakutani and that 
of Nash, by applying Theorem 4 of [1] to the mapping 
^ 2 '  *  *  •  '  ^ ^  1  ^  ^ 2  ^  X  .  
Corollary 3.1. If each is a singleton, then there 
exist x°, Xg,.x° such that 
f-j^(x^, Xg, . . X^) > fj^(x^, Xg, . . x^) 
x°, ..., x°) > fgCx®, Xg'"'" 
fn(*l' Xg,..., x°) > f^(x°, x°,x^). 
Corollary 3-2. If f(x, y) is a real-valued continuous 
function on X x Y, where X and Y are compact and 
convex subsets of Banach space, and f assumes a unique 
maximum over X for each y e Y and assumes a unique 
minimum over Y for each x e X, then there exist 
x° G X and y° e Y such that 
y) > f(x°, y°) > f(x, y°). 
20 
Thccrc- 3 • 1 Let Xg,..., be real-vaiuea 
n 
continuous functions on n X. ^ where each X. is 
i=l ^ 1 
homeomorphic to a convex compact subset of Banach 
space. For the functions f^ over define sets 
analogously to the sets defined above for the 
functions f^. if all are singletons, then there 
exist x^, Xg,..., x° such that 
f^(x°, x®,..x°) > f^(x^, Xg,x°) 
^2 ^ ^ 1' ^2 ' ' ' ' * ^ — ^2 ^ ^ 1^ ^2 ' ' ' ' ' ^ 
f J ^2 ' ' ' ' ' ^ — ^n ( ^1^ ^2 ' ' ' ' ' ^ 
Proof. By assumption, there exist homeomorphisms 
hj^; X^ "* Si — 1, 2,..., n, 
S. a convex compact subset of Banach space. 
^ I am grateful to Professor D. L. Isaacson for 
pointing out an error. 
21 
Let 
s —  h . i  —  I f  n  
and 
The maps hj^ are 1-1 onto, and each function f^ 
assumes a unique maximum in x^ over for each fixed 
(x^, ..., Xj,..., x^; j i) . Hence each function 
assumes a unique maximum in s^ over for each fixed 
( s ^ , S j , . . . ,  s ^ ;  i  ^  i ) .  F u r t h e r ,  e a c h  i s  
n 
continuous on n S.. Hence, in view of Lemma 1, there 
L=1 1 
exists a point (s°,s°) such that, for all i, 
k^(s^,..., s^,..., s^) ^  k^^s^y..., s^,..., s^), 
e  S ^ .  
Since the maps h^ are 1-1 onto, this implies the 
result with x i - . 
22 
Ccrollery. Let f(:c, y) be = real-value^ couLiuuoua 
function of two variables x and y on X x Y where 
X and Y are homeomorphic to compact convex subsets 
of Banach space. If f assumes a unique maximum over 
X for each y s Y and assumes a unique minimum over 
Y for each x c X, then there exist x° and y° such 
that 
y) > f(x°, y°) > f(x, y°) 
Theorem 2 explores the possibility of not restricting 
the strategy spaces of a two-person game in identical ways; 
this has been done in [16] for the zero-sum case, with 
strategy spaces consisting of distributions. 
Theorem 3-2. Let f(x, y) and g(x, y) be real-valued 
continuous functions on X x Y. If and defined 
in Lemma 1 are singletons and one of X or Y is 
homeomorphic to a compact convex subset of Banach space, 
with the other compact, then there exist x° and y° such 
that 
Y°) > f(x, y°) 
9(x°, y°) > 9(x°, y) 
25 
Proof. Suppose X is a compact convex subset of Banach 
space. Since the Ag are singletons, the mapping 
9: x^ Ag is in fact point-to-point. Similarly, the 
map ij;: Xg -• A^ is point-to-point. Hence ij/çp is a 
point-to-point map of X into itself, and continuous by 
virtue of the continuity of f and g. Hence, in view 
of Schauder's Theorem [5], has fixed point x^ and 
(x^, qj(x^) ) is the desired equilibrium point. 
Suppose now that X is homeomorphic to a compact 
convex subset S of Banach space, i.e. there exists a 
continuous h: h(x) = s in 1-1. Define k^(s, y) = 
f(h ^(s), y) and kgfs, y) = g(h~^(s), y) then 
and kg are continuous and assume unique maxima for 
each y and s as in the proof of Theorem 1. Now 
apply the argument above. 
Corollary. Put g = -f; then, under the same assumptions 
of Theorem 2, f has a saddle point. 
The first example below illustrates Theorem 1, and 
the next two Theorem 2. Three further examples illustrate 
situations that do not satisfy the conditions of Theorems 
1 and 2 and for which no equilibrium point exists. 
Consider the set of all distribution functions 
p 
on [0, 1] with the same variance a . Define the 
equivalence class ^ as the set of all elements of 
2U 
wizti tne same mean ^. We shall consider a three-person 
game whose three strategy sets Xg, X_ all are 
composed of equivalence classes . We note that the 
W' 
X. are not convex. This is because if, say, F and 
are representatives respectively of and , 
Q p 
then aF + pF has variance a + aP(M.-, - jj^ ) and 
M-1 Pg <-
hence lies in no class However, letting I be 
the interval of the real line corresponding to the 
2 possible values of |i for the given a , and topologizing 
such that the map .J-^ ij. is a homeomorphism, it is 
clear that X^ is indeed homeomorphic to the convex and 
compact subset I of the line. 
Consider now representatives F , F and F 
of elements .> ,,A and of St, and . 1' 2 3 
Define the three payoff functions 
'"mj' " 
,1 nl r^l 
'o ' 
fo Jo - 2)(Xi + 4=l=3)dF^^(=i)dF^2(x2)dF^^(x2) 
(3^2 - 2)(^^ + 
25 
•F f y 2 . ^ P 
kig' ~ ^5 " ^ 
It is clear that the uniqueness required by Theorem 1 
is met here, so that an equilibrium point is guaranteed. 
S u c h  a  p o i n t ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  i s  ( J ^ \ / y  )  -
The next example illustrates Theorem 2. Let Y be 
the unit circle: [(y^, y^ ) : y| + yg = 1] and let X be 
the closed interval [0, ir]. Let f(x, y) = y^sin x + 
y^Gos X and let g(x, y) = -(yj - f) - ^y^ - ^ ^  )  •  
Then it is clear that the uniqueness required by Theorem 2 
is met, and an equilibrium point is guaranteed, despite the 
fact that Y is not homeomorphic to any convex set. Such 
an equilibrium point is (0, (0, l)). 
An example where X is only homeomorphic to convex 
compact subset of Banach space is provided by X = 
{(x^, Xg, x^): x| + Xg + x| = 3, > 0} and Y = 
l(yi, Yg, y^): = 1, Yi > 0}, with f(x, y) = 
-g(x, y) -= E(x^ + l)y\. The saddle point is ((1, 1, 1), 
(1. 1. 1)). 
It is interesting to verify that when both X and 
Y arc not homeomorphic to a compact convex subset, then 
there may not exist an equilibrium point, even when the 
uniqueness condition is met. A zero-sum example of this 
is given by X = i(x^, Xg ) : x^ + Xg = 1}, Y = Yg ) = 
26 
' Ïg - !(*, y) = + XgY^. To see this 
put x^ =: cos 0, Xg - sin 0, = cos == sin cp, 
0 < 0 < 27r, 0 < cp < 2Tr, and f(x, y) = cos 6 sin cp + 
sin 0 cos cp = sin( 0 + cp) . 
It may also be of interest to explore^ by means of 
examples of this last type and the theorems, possible 
relations among a zero-sum three-person game and its 
various two-person sub-games obtained by fixing the 
third player's strategy. One finds, as expected, that 
the occurrence of equilibrium points in the sub-games is 
quite unrelated to their occurrence in the three-person 
game. For example the first of the following examples 
illustrates a three-person zero-sum game without 
equilibrium points with a two-person sub-game (players 
II and III) having an equilibrium point, while the 
second example illustrates a three-person zero-sum game 
with an equilibrium point with a sub-game (players I and 
II) without equilibrium points (assuming x^ O). 
(1) ^2' ^^1 ^ 
^2(^1' ^2' *1,) = "^1^2 " ^2^1 2*3 
f^C^i, Xg, X^) = -3x^ 
27 
^  r / _ _  _ _  \  _ _ 2  , 2  
-^1^' "^1 ^1 ^ 
~ {( ^2 ' Yg ^ ' ^2 ^2 ~ ^ } 
ay = [0, 
^2 ' ) ~ ^3 ^^1^2 ^ ^2^1 ^ 
f^{x^, Xg, x^) = -x^(x^yg + XgY^) 
f^ ( ^2 ' ) ~ ® 
Xg, X^ are the same as above. 
28 
J-V. r,<>JUXljiJBKXUW FUlJNT OF K-STAGE GAME 
The notion of a k-stage game, in the context of 
2-person zero-sum matrix game extensions, is discussed 
for example in Chapter V of [10]. The related notion of 
an n-person game of perfect information is discussed for 
example in Chapter I of [10]. An area that seems not to 
be explicitly discussed in the literature is the 
generalization involving zero-sum 2-person k-stage games 
with arbitrary random components not necessarily related 
to the extension process. Another generalization would 
consider n-person games with random components corre­
sponding to the extension process. More generally still, 
one might consider n-person k-stage games with arbitrary 
random components. This section discusses the existence 
of equilibrium points in the latter situation. 
Definition 1. Let Ç be a set of games G. A "game-
valued" game is an (n+l)-plet Z p, 
Gp)}), where of [^^3 are probability 
measures over Ç = {G^,G^]. 
We remark first that, as in the case of the game 
extensions treated in Chapters II and III, equilibrium 
points of games with random payoffs will be computed on 
the base of expected payoffs. 
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point, at which the payoffs to the n players are a^^*. 
Let Cp, . . f jp) be the probability assigned to 
by the probability distribution over the games 
corresponding to the strategy choices (cp, cjp) • The 
game "derived from r (Ç )"  is the 2n-plet E p, 
£mp, ( (Jpj ... J Gp) } ) ^ i — n. and irip, ( Gp? • • • j CTp) 
is the probability measures induced on the real line by 
ljp(ap, Gp) through the transformation G^ -* a^^, i.e. 
Pr[aTj] - ^p(ap,.•Op). Note that the set of 
probabilities involved in m^, is the same for each 
player. Also, since there may exist more than one 
equilibrixim points in G^, there may exist more than one 
derived games. At any rate, for specific choices of 
equilibrium points, the expectation of the person 
is E s^^mp, = E a^jjj-p^G ) . 
Definition 3. A 2-stage game Q ( Q  i  r( <^ ) ) is the game 
(Uq, ..., Uq, {n^(|-iQ, . . ., M.q)}) defined as follows 
in terms of the game-valued game and its associated G^; 
U^( E ^  X n si) with elements u^ = ( aî fs . . , where Q ^ F G  Q  ^  R  ^  1 ]  
s^j € is a strategy for player j in G^, and where 
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the prooaDiiiry measure u^) is given by 
E dm^ . {s . . }((a^( cTp, . . . , a^) ), with dmP. the probability 
i G J - ^ ^ G 
measure for the payoff to player j in game G^ corre­
sponding to the strategy choices s^^. 
Theorem 4.1. Consider a 2-stage game 0 ( Q ,  r (  Ç  )  )  .  
Suppose that 
(1) Every game G^ of ij has at least one 
equilibrium point ®ij** 
(2) Some game r' {Ç) derived from ) has an 
equilibrium point (op*,..., ), then Q has 
. . . . / I* n* \ 
an equilibrium point (u^ , • ••, j . 
Proof. Let u^ = ( where the are 
the equilibrium strategies in the game G^ leading to 
the equilibrium payoffs a^^* yielding _r' . Then the 
expectation of the player at that point is 
/'Q(UQ , f u^*, ..., Ug*) = J X E ap*)dm^^ 
i G 
(where dm^.^ is the probability measure for the payoff 
G^ 
to the player in the i^^ game at the equilibrium 
point (s^j*)) 
* 
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^ V J ^ } p.p\^ 9***9 9***9 U ^  j 
1 G 
= 2 
_ ^ i/ 1* j n*\ 
^ ^ ij ^r ^r ' * * * 9 cT j 
in view of (2) 
= S ( J X dm^ ) |ap( , . ., a^, , Op* ) 
> E ( r X dm^.ia^) 
i G ^ 
in view of (1), where dm^^ is the probability measure 
G 
for the payoff to player j in the i^^ game at 
* * ' f ' • ' i ® in* ^ 
J X Z lu^dm^ 
H, 1* j n*> 
,  ( '  '  ^Q''''' )  
The following further result generalizes Theorem of [2]. 
32 
Q( y , r( C| )) for which the set Cj consists of (k-1)-
stage games . Theorem 4.1 provides an inductive 
algorithm for an equilibrium point for n-person games 
analogous to that for a saddle point in the zero-sum 
games, 
(1) Verify whether all games have an equi­
librium point {s^j*}. If yes, compute 
a d e f i n e d  a b o v e .  
(2) Verify whether the derived games associated 
with all Qg have an equilibrium point at 
4 ^  
tai } for some choice of equilibrium point 
for the games Q^. If yes, then every 
has equilibrium point at [u^ }, {u^ } = 
°2 ^2 
ia^, is..*}} and one may define a^P.^ by 
X 
virtue of Theorem 1. One proceeds next to 
(3) Verify whether the derived games associated 
with all have at least one equilibrium 
n "X" 
point [a;i }. If yes, then every Q_ has an 
equilibrium point ("I*} = (0^^, and 
a^^j^ was defined by virtue of Theorem 1. One 
continues in this way till step k. Verify 
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whether the deriname with rids 
an equilibrium point [ai, }. If yes, then Q, has an 
^k-l 
equilibrium point [u^*] = {ait , {uj* }}• 
^ ^k-1 ^k-1 
Example. 
= ((%}, [y], tm^,(x, y)}) 
G 
where assigns probabilities x(l - y) + y(l - x) 
G 
and xy+ (l-x)(l-y) respectively to -1 and 1 
2 
and where m , assigns x(l - y) + y(l - x) and 
G 
xy + (1 - x)(1 - y) assigns respectively to 1 and 2. 
= ([%}, {y], im^gfx, y)}) 
G 
where m^ assigns probabilities xy, fl - x)y, x(l - y) 
G 
and (1 - x)(l - y) respectively to 1, 2, 5 and -1 
2 
and where m _(x, y) assigns probabilities xy, (1 - x)y 
G 
x(1 - y), and (1 - x)(l - y) respectively to 2, 1, -5, 
and 3 • 
= ([x], iy}, lm^_(x, y)}) 
G^ 
where assigns probabilities xy, (1 - x)y, x(l - y) 
G-^ 
and (1 - x)(l - y) respectively to 2, 6, 5, and 3 
2 
and where m -z assigns probabilities xy, (1 - x)y, 
G^ 
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x(i - y), and (1 - x)(l - y) respectively to 2, 6, 8, 
and 3 • 
= ({x], cY}, y)}) 
G 
where m\ assigns probabilities xy, (1 - x)y, x(l - y), 
G 
and (1 - x)(l - y) respectively to 0, 2, 2, and 1 
2 
and where m assigns probabilities xy, ( 1 - x)y, 
G 
x( 1 - y), and (1 - x)(l - y) respectively to -1. 3.- 0 ,  
and -1. 
= {A, B] 
a) = 
'^(A, b) = (^, 
'4(B, a) = (1, 
M(B, b) = 
Z? - {a, b] 
1 1 1\ 
4" 4' 4'' 
0, gr) 
0,  0 ,  0)  
0,  0,  
m^i = (1. 1) 
G 
and 
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'11 ^12* 
= 2 
m 
1* 
= (#, |) 
-"^2 - (#' I' 
and 
a^i* _ I ^22* _ £ " 7 
%; = (i- §) = (§, §) 
and 
®51* = '* ®32* = ^  
m\ = ( 1, 0) 
G 
2* 
^ 1|. ~ ( 
G 
0:) 
and 
a^i* = 2 a^2* = 0 
The equilibrium strategy for player I is to choose A 
and the equilibrium strategy for player II is to choose 
a. Hence (A, a) is the equilibrium point in the 
derived game. Now, an equilibrium point of the 2-stage 
({(0 'T) '(§ 'j) '(T 'T)] 'e) = 
' ('£ i£\ _ 6^ (((0 'T) '(^ '(T '1)3 'v) 
5> L 
9^ 
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V. CHARACTERIZATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF 
EQUILIBRIUM POINTS OF N-PERSON MATRIX GAMES 
As pointed out in previous sections, Nash. [8] has 
demonstrated the existence of equilibrium points of n-
person matrix game extensions. We now present a theorem 
helpful in the construction of such equilibrium points, 
and illustrate the ideas involved with a two-person 
example. 
Theorem 5»1. In a bi-matrix game, where = (a^j) and 
Mg = (buj) and both payoff matrices are m x n, (x*, y*) 
is an equilibrium point iff the following conditions are 
satisfied; 
E a . y. * for some r < m and Vs 4 P-
i ] 
k = 1 3  ' ' •  >  ^  
and 
for some t < n and Vu=^ q , 
£= 1 t 
with 
^8 
 ^-Z. \ 
I 
r\ _ / — — 
and 
y^» = 0 u ^  q s — 1*- t 
Proof. Suppose (x*, y*) is an equilibrium point. 
(4) Mj_(x, y*) = Xj_( S a^j y^*) + x^ ( E a^^ y^*) + 
+ ^n,( I =mj yj*' 
(5) Mg(x*, y) = y^( S b^^ x^*) + ^ ( E x^*) + 
i i — 
+ f ^in =i*) 
Since x* is to maximize (4) 
x * = 0 
s 
if Z a . y.* < maxf S a . y.*} 
j P j 
Similarly 
Y *  = 0  i f  E b .  x . * <  m a x [  E  b .  x . * ]  
. lU X g i iq X j 
On the other hand if (1), (2), (3) are satisfied, i 
is clear that (x*, y*) is an equilibrium point. 
Theorem $.1 generalizes in a straightforward manner 
to the n-person case. A further comment concerns the 
relation between equilibrium points and certain related 
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tocauuxe poxncs . 
Consider a good strategy for player I if is 
played as a zero-sum game, with non-zero components 
[x X }. Then any of player II's good strategies 
Pi Pr 
y in that game is an equilibrium strategy for player II 
if there exists x such that x = 0 if s / p, , 
s -^K 
1, r and E b. x. = 
i ^^1 ^ * - ? ^ iq , ^i > ? ^it "i 1 ^r X 
where (y y ] are the non-zero components of y 
qi 9r' 
and t 4 q^, k = 1,r'. Further, if a I-good 
strategy x in playing as a zero-sum game and a 
Il-good y in playing as a zero-sum game have no zero 
component, then (x, y) is an equilibrium point. 
Example. 
M, 
1 
6 
1 5 
4 2 
Mg = 
5 4 2 
2 3 7 
Mj_(x, yx ) - x^(y^* + Yg* + 5y^*) + + ^-y^* + 2y^*) 
Mgfxx , y) y^(5x^* + 2X2*) + + Tx^* ) 
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Suppose 
(1) + y^* + 5y^* > +  ^ y^* + 2y_* 
then Max M^(x, y) = y^* + y^* + 5y^* when x^ = 1, 
Xg = 0, Take x* = (1, O); then 5^^* + 2Xg* is the 
maximum coefficient of y^, i = 1, 2, 3. So 
Max N^(x*, y) occurs when y^ - y^ = = 0 - This 
contradicts (1). Suppose 
(2) y^* + Yg* + 5y^* < Gy^* + 4yg* + 2y^* 
then Max M^(x, y*) = 6y^* + 4yg^ + 2y^* when = 0, 
Xg = 1. Take x* = (0, 1 ) ; then 2x^* + TXg* is the 
maximum coefficient of y^, i = 1, 2, 3- So 
Max f^(x*, y) occurs when y^= 1, y^ = y^ = 0. This 
contradicts (2). Suppose 
( 3 )  Y^* + Yg* + 5Y^* = 6y^* + 4yg^ + 2y^*> 
i.e. 5y^ + 3Y2 ~ 3Y^ = 0 together with y^ + Yg + Y^ = 1• 
If + 2Xg*, 4x^* + 3^2*7 2x^* + 7^2* are ail 
unequal, then they have a maximum, e.g. + 2Xg^, 
then Max M^ ( x*, y ) occurs when y^ = 1, y^ = Y^ = 0 -
This does not satisfy (3) and the same for the rest. 
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Hence they cannot all be unequal. Now take 
4x^* + hence y^ = 0. This does not satisfy ( 3 ) *  
Take 
( 4 )  5 X i *  +  S X g *  =  2 X 1 *  +  T X g * ,  
hence Yg - 0 - Substitute y^ = 0 in (5)» and obtain 
y^^ - From (4) together with x^* + x^* = 
we obtain x^* ^  ^2* ~ Finally take 
( 5 )  4 x i *  +  3 x 2 *  =  2 % ^ *  +  T X g * ,  
hence y^ = 0. From (5), y^ = y^ = From (5), 
2 1 
x^* = Xg* = J. But 
5%!* + 2Xg* = 4 > 4X1* + 3X2* -
which is not an equilibrium point. Hence we have found 
the equilibrium point ( (§j &), (&, 0, ^ ) ) • 
Vi. AXxUivJATlC DERIVATION OF SOME DECISION 
CRITERIA IN GAMES AGAINST NATURE WHEN 
THE STRATEGY SET OF NATURE IS COUNTABLY INFINITE 
Besides the issue of the existence and construction 
of equilibrium points, it could be of interest to find 
behavioristic reasons why a player might choose an 
equilibrium point strategy. This type of consideration 
appears for example in [7]j in the case where a single 
player faces a passive nature, i.e., where a single player 
must choose among payoff columns whose coordinates are 
indexed by the strategies of nature. It also appears in 
[13], in the sense that it is attempted to deduce the 
value of a two-person zero sum matrix game as a conse­
quence of certain axioms supposedly describing the 
valuation placed by two competing players on an array of 
payoffs from II to I. 
However, this sort of behavioristic approach has 
seemed difficult to apply to n-person games. Indeed, the 
attempt in [13] relative to the two-person zero-sum case 
seems unsatisfactory, since, in the proof deducing the 
value from axiomatic considerations, the author uses the 
fact that Z a.. x. > v, ¥. and Z a.. y. < v, V. , 
i 1] 1 - ] j 1] ] - 1 
with V the value of the game, an algebraic fact appar­
ently not derived from the axioms. This thesis thus has 
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abandoned che attempt to develop an axiomatic behavioristic 
characterization of equilibrium points, and has limited 
itself to some simplifications of the apparently more 
successful theory in [7]. Specifically, I shall consider 
extensively some of the xesults in [7] from the case of 
finite to that of countably many states of nature. 
There are several well-known criteria for finite 
games against nature; 
Laplace. Choose the action (row) maximizing the 
average payoff a^. 
Wald minimax. Choose the action (row) which 
maximizes the minimum payoff min a... ij 
Hurwicz-optimism-pessimism. Select a constant 
0 _< a _< 1 which measures the player's optimism. 
For each row let a be the smallest component 
and A the largest. Choose a row maximizing 
aA + (1 - a ) a . 
Savage regret. Define r^^ = a^^ - Max a^^. Apply 
the Wald criterion to the matrix (r..). 
Milnor [7] characterized these criteria by essentially 
the following axioms (A > B indicates that A is 
preferred to B and A > B denotes that A > but not 
B > A), where Axiom 2 below is an adaptation suitable for 
the case of countably infinite strategy space. 
4-4 
1. Orderinq. Tne relation > is a complete 
ordering of the rows. That is, it is a transitive relation 
such that for any two rows r, r' either r > r' or 
r ' > r . 
Axiom 2. Symmetry. This ordering is independent of the 
numbering of the rows and rows differing only by a 
permutation are equivalent. (Two rows are equivalent 
r' ~ r", if r' > r" and r" > r'). 
Axiom 3. Strong domination. If each component of r is 
greater than the corresponding component of r', then 
r > r ' . 
Axiom 4. Continuity. If the rows r^^^ converge to r 
and if r^^^ > r^ for each k and some r^^, then the 
limit row r and r, satisfy r > r, . 
X J-
Axiom 5. Linearity. The ordering relation is not changed 
if the matrix (a^^) is replaced by (aj^) where 
®ij " ^ ®ij X > 0. 
The following four axioms serve to distinguish 
between the four criteria, 
Axiom 6. Row adjunction. The ordering between the old 
rows is not changed by the adjunction of a new row. 
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Ajtiom { . coxumn linearity. The ordering is not changed 
if a constant is added to a column. 
Axiom 8. Column duplication. The ordering is not changed 
if a new possibly infinite set of columns, identical with 
some old column, is adjoined to the matrix. (Thus we are 
only interested in what states of Nature are possible, and 
not in how often each state may have been counted in the 
formation of the matrix). 
Axiom 9- Convexity. If row r is equal to the average 
(1/2)(r' + r") of two equivalent rows, then r > r'. 
(Two rows are equivalent, r' ~ r", if r' _> r" and 
r" > r'). 
Axiom 10. Special row adjunction. The ordering between 
the old rows is not changed by the adjunction of a new 
row,^ provided that no component of this new row is greater 
than the corresponding component of all old rows. 
If there exist countably many strategies for Nature, 
the same set of axioms can be used as well, except for the 
case of the Laplace criterion. 
Lemma 1. Assuming Axioms 1, 2, and 6, row ordering is 
unaffected by column permutation. 
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•bemma 'd. Assuming 4, it each, component of r is greater 
than or equal to the corresponding component of r', then 
r > r ' . 
Lemma 3. Assuming 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8, two rows having 
the same infimum and having the same supremum are equiva­
lent . 
Proof. Let (a^y a^^..., a^,...) be any row having the 
infimum a and supremum A; then 
(A . a, a,.*.) ^  ^a^^, ^2* 
<c ^a T • A^ A,.,.) 
by Lemma 2 and Axiom 2 where are arbitrary positive 
numbers such that ^ 0 as k -• oo. By Axiom 4, then 
(a, a, s,..,) < Sg ) f •••) ^  ( 3 ? A, A, .. « ) « 
But 
(a, a, a,...) ~(a. A, A,...) 
since the matrix containing these two rows can be obtained 
from the 2-column matrix containing ^ ^ by column 
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ûuplication (Axiom O). 
Theorem 1. The Wald criterion is characterized by Axioms 
1, 2, 5» 4, 6, 8, and 9. 
Proof. Applying the convexity axiom (9) to the matrix 
a ha + A) &a + A) 2^ 2' 
a a A 
a A a 
we have 
(A, ^ (a + A), ^(a + A)) > (a, a. A) 
Hence, by Lemma 5 and Axiom 8, 
(a, |(a + A)) > (a. A). 
Cons ider 
^1 "5 1 
"3 4^ + 4-^ 4 3 + 
l(a + A) 2 
:^(a + A) a 
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(a, |-a + + ;^A) > (a, a, |^(a + A))) 
whence 
- (a, + ^ A) > (a, |-( a + A)) > (a, A) . 
Repeating this process, we obtain 
, (a, a) > (a. A). 
It follows that 
(a. A) ~ (a, a). 
Theorem 2. The Hurwicz criterion is characterized by 
Axioms 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8. 
Proof. Let a be the sup of all real numbers such that 
(x, X,...) < (0, 1, 1,.,.)• 
All real numbers are divided into two sets S and T 
such that either 
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(x, X, . . . ) < (0, 1, 1, . . . ) 
or 
(y, y,...) > (0, 1, 1,...) 
by the axiom of ordering. Since 
(2,  2 , . . . )  > (0,  1,  1 , . . . )  
and 
(-1, -1....) < (0, 1, 1, ...), 
S and T are not empty. Since 
( a + e ,  a +  e , . . . )  € T ,  
by the continuity axiom 
But 
(a, a,...) < (0, 1, 1,... 
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Hence 
(a, a,...) ~(0, 1, 1,...) 
Now multiply by A - a and add a where A = sup[a^} 
and a = inf{a^}. We obtain, using the linearity axiom, 
(q,(A — a) + a, a. ( A  — a) 4 -  a, ct( A  — a) + a,...) ~ 
(a. A, A,...) 
i.e. 
((1 ~ a. )a + ctA, (1— a)a+ a A, (1— cx)a+ otA, ) ~ 
^a. A, A,•.•)• 
But, by the previous result, 
a, A, A, . . . ) ~ ^2' ^3' " ' • ) 
implies, by transitivity, that 
((1 — a.)a 4- aA, (1— a)a+ aA, ) ~ (a^y a^, . . . ) 
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wliicîi dinouncs co the Hurwicz criterion. 
Theorem 3. Savage's criterion is characterized by Axioms 
1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10. 
Proof. By Axiom Y, it is permissible to subtract the 
maximum element from each column. We can adjoin a row 
with all elements 0 without changing the ordering of 
old rows by Axiom 10. Now, using Axiom 10 again, to 
adjoin or delete any row which has no positive component 
does not alter the row ordering, so that Axiom 10 takes 
the place of Axiom 6 for the Wald criterion. So the 
rest of the proof is the same as that of Theorem 1. 
So far, the arguments have been similar to those 
given by Milnor. Consideration of the Laplace criterion 
requires further modification. In this case, the defi­
nition of equivalence must be modified. 
Now, we turn to the Laplace criterion. In order to 
avoid a situation such as 
(1, -1, 1,...) ~ (1, 1, -1, 1, 1, -1,...), 
we change Axiom 2 into the following: 
Axiom 2'. The ordering is independent of the ordering of 
the rows and columns for any given number of columns. 
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Tlic ucTinition or equivalence for this case is modified to 
the following not entirely satisfactory constructive one. 
Definition. Two rows (a^, a^, . . . ) and (b^, ...) 
with countably infinitely many elements are equivalent 
if the following is true: For e > 0 and each positive 
integer N, let n(e, N) be the number of differences 
- b^I, 1 ^  k that exceed e. Then, for each 
e > 0, lim n( e ,  n ) / n  =  0. 
N-* 00 
Theorem 4. If the ordering is such that Axioms 1, 2', 6, 
and 7 hold and such that two bounded rows with the same 
Cesaro sum are equivalent, then the two rows are equiva­
lent in the sense defined above. 
N N 
Proof. For each N, we may suppose E a. > Z b. 
i= 1 ^ i= 1 ^ 
where ^2' * * ** and (b^y bg, . . ., b^) are any 
two rows. Subtract min[a^., b^} from each row. This 
operation does not change the ordering of these two rows 
by Axiom 7- If not all b are zero, then permute the 
elements within each row so that non-zero elements of each 
row come first. (This is permissible by 2' and 6). Denote 
these rows by a£, a^) and (b£, b^,..., b^). 
Subtract minfai, b:} from each column. If all b' are 
*•1 1 •' 
not zero, then permute the elements in each row so that 
non-zero components come first. Subtract the minimum 
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v.-umjjoxient of each column. •••. Proceeding in this way, 
we obtain two rows (c^^ Cg,..., c^J, c non-negative, 
and (0, 0,..., O). Suppose there are n terms c 
exceeding a given e > 0. Then c^ 4- c^ + • + c^ > ne 
By the operation described above, 
N N 
+ Cg + • • • + = E a. - E b. 
1= 1 1= 1 
, N N 
*- Si - ^i) > W 
1= X J. 
By our assumption. 
, N N 
lim »( Z a. - Z b.)=0 
N-oo^i=l ^ i=l 
0 > lim 
N- oo 
lim ^  - 0 
(a^i^, Bg, . . . ) ~ (b^, bg, . . . ) . 
It would seem possible, under Axioms 1, 2', 6, and 7 
to relate not only the equivalence defined above to Cesaro 
sum equalities, but further to relate a suitably defined 
preference criterion to Cesaro sum inequalities. 
A last criterion, namely Maxmax has not been discussed 
5^^ 
iij MiliiOi, buc may be treated as is the Wald criterion. 
In the proof for the Wald criterion we used the 
convexity axiom. Suppose that this axiom is replaced by 
the following: 
Axiom 9'. If row r is equal to the average 
(l/2).(r' + r") of two equivalent rows, then r < r'. 
Use the following matrix; 
A 
A a A 
A a 
Then 
(a, (1/2)(a +a), (1/2)(a + A) <(A, a, A). 
Hence 
(A, (l''2)(a-fA)) <(A, a). 
Repeating this procedure, we have 
(A, A) < (A, a); 
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but 
(A, A) > (A, a). 
Therefore, 
(A, A) ~ (A, a). 
Thus, replacing Axiom 9 by 9' gives a characterization 
not of the criterion ordering according to inf{a^} as 
in the case of the Wald criterion, but rather of a 
criterion ordering according to supia^}.. 
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